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Murphy is a set of techniques and tools 
under investigation for their potential in 
enhancing the safety of software. This paper 
describes some of the work which has been done 
and some which is planned. 
Introduction 
A system or subsystem may be described as safet11-
critical if a run-time failure can result in death, injury, 
loss of equipment or property, or environmental harm. 
Computers are not inherently unsafe, and, until rela-
tively recently, computers were not used to control com-
plex, safety-critical systems. Thus although computers 
were used in such potentially unsafe systems as aircraft, 
air traffic control, nuclear power, defense, and aerospace 
systems, a natural reluctance to add unknown and com-
plex factors to these systems kept computers out of moat 
safety-critical loops. But the potential advantages of 
using computers is now outweighing apprehension, and 
both computer scientists and system engineers are 
finding themselves faced with some difficult and unsolved 
problems. 
In safety-critical systems, it is not ungsual to9have reliability requirements in the range of 10- to 10- pro-
bability of failure over a short period of time. This 
translates into requirements such as one failure per 
thousand years. Unfortunately, current software 
engineering technology does not guarantee that such· reli-
abilities can be achieved for software (or, for that 
matter, even measured). In fact, available evidence indi-
cates that current software reliability figures are, at best, 
orders of magnitude lesi than required [5]. Software 
engineering techniques which attempt to prevent, elim-
inate, or tolerate software faults may increase the time 
between failures, but do not provide assurance that 
catastrophic failures will not occur. 
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What can be done? One option is not to build 
these systems or not to use computers to control them. 
For the most part, however, this option is unrealistic -
there are too many good reasons why computers should 
be used and too few alternatives. Another option is to 
consider reliability in a less absolute sense. There are 
many types of failures possible in any complex system, 
with consequences varying from minor annoyance up to 
death or injury. It seems reasonable to focus on the 
failures that have the most drastic consequences. Even if 
all failures cannot be prevented, it may be possible to 
ensure that the failures that do occur are of minor conse-
quence or that even if a potentially serious failure does 
occur, the system will "fail-safe" (in a manner which will 
not have catastrophic or serious results). 
This approach is useful under the following cir-
cumstances: (1) not all failures are of equal conse-
quences and (2) there are a relatively small number of 
failures that can lead to catastrophic results. Under 
these circumstances, it is possible to augment traditional 
reliability techniques that attempt to eliminate all 
failures with techniques that concentrate on the high-
cost failures. These new techniques often involve a 
"backward" approach that starts with determining what 
are the unacceptable or high-cost failures and then 
ensures that these particular failures do not occur or at 
least minimizes the probability of their occurrence. 
It is important to stress that these are s11stem prob-
lems. When computers are used as component.a of larger 
systems, considering the computer software in isolation 
will be of limited usefulness. Many (if not most) serious 
accidents are caused by complex unplanned (and unfor-
tunate) interactions between components of the system 
and by multiple failures. That is, moat accidents ori-
ginate in subsystem interfaces [6,8]. Software failures 
and software-induced system failures may be caused by 
undetected hardware errors such as transient faults caus-
ing mutilation of data, security violations, human mis-
takes during operation and maintenance, errors in under-
lying or supporting software systems, or interfacing prob-
lems with other components of the system including tim-
ing errors. Therefore, techniques used to build software 
for embedded systems, especially with respect to analysis 
and verification, are going to have to consider the system 
as a whole (especially the interactions between the com-
ponents of the system or subsystem) and not just the 
software in isolation. 
We have been considering these problems and 
developing techniques ~hat might be useful in this new 
approach to reliability. ln general, we are looking at the 
following three areas: 
• Software Hazard Anal11sis and Requirements 
Specification: What kinda of system models and 
analysis tools are most useful? How can software 
requirements be derived from these system models? 
How can the models and requirements be analyzed 
to determine important reliability and safety pro-
perties? 
• Verification and Validation: How can safety proper-
ties be identified, specified, and formally verified? 
What techniques appear the most promising? How 
can they be implemented so that they can be used 
in industrial environments and not just in university 
research labs? 
• ABBeBBment of Safetv: How can the safety of 
software be accurately measured and assessed? Is 
this possible? Is this feasible? · 
• Software Design and Run-Time Environments: 
What techniques and environments are most 
appropriate for safety-critical software? How can 
the software detect unsafe states during execution? 
What types of self-monitoring, external monitoring, 
fault-tolerance, fail-safe, and other software design 
techniques can be used to aid in the design of the 
software especially with regard to handling run-time 
fault detection and recovery? 
Our long-range goal is not to provide a set of tools 
for industrial use, but to investigate what new tech-
niques and tools may be useful by developing theory and 
building prototypes. The name of the experimental 
methodology is Murphy. Murphy is, at this part, far 
from a complete methodology. Since it is still in the for-
mative stages, much of the work has involved examining 
alternative approaches. This paper describes what has 
been accomplished so far and some of the projects under-
way or planned. A more general survey of the work in 
the field can be found in Leveson [15]. 
It is important to note that although Murphy 
currently focuses on design and verification, there are 
other aspects of any software safety program which are 
just as important. For example, the experiences of sys-
tem safety engineers has shown that the root causes of 
accidents often relate to poor management [28]. Simi-
larly, the degree of safety achieved in a system depends 
directly on management emphasis. Safety engineers 
have carefully defined the requirements for management 
of safety-critical programs such as setting policy and 
defining goals, defining responsibility, granting authority, 
fixing accountability, and documenting and tracking 
hazards and their resolution (audit trails). These general 
management principles need to applied to the manage-
ment of safety-critical software projects as well. 
The work to be described can be divided into two 
categories: software safety modeling and analysis tech-
niques and design techniques. 
Modeling and Analysis 
Software safety modeling and analysis techniques 
identify software hazards and safety-critical single and 
multiple failure sequences, determine software safety 
requirements including timing requirements, and verify 
and measure software for safety. Software safety 
analysis and verification is beginning to be required by 
contra.Ctors of safety-critical systems and by government 
regulatory agencies. For example, at least three DoD 
standards include related tasks. A general safety stan-
dard (MIL-STD-882B) includes tasks for Software 
Hazard Analysis and verification of software safety. An 
Air Force standard for missile and weapon systems 
(MIL-STD-1574A) requires a Software Safety Analysis 
and Integrated Software Safety Analysis (which includes 
the analysis of the interfaces of the software to the rest 
of the system, i.e. the assembled system). And the U.S. 
Navy has a draft standard for nuclear weapon systems 
(MIL-STD-SNS) that requires Software Nuclear Safety 
Analysis. All of these analyses are not meant to substi-
tute for regular verification and validation, but instead 
involve special analysis procedures to verify that the 
software is safe. It is not clear, however, that the pro-
cedures yet exist that will satisfy these requirements. 
Software Safety Requirements Analysis 
Determining the requirements for software has 
proved very difficult. However, in terms of safety (and 
probably most other software qualities), this may be one 
of the most important sources of problems. Many 
mishaps can be traced back to a fundamental misunder-
standing about the desired operation of the so:tware. 
After studying actual mishaps where computers were 
involved, safety engineers have concluded that inade-
quate design foresight and specification errors are the 
greatest cause of software safety problems [6,9]. These 
problems arise from many possible causes including the 
difficulty of the problem intrinsically, a lack of emphasis 
on it in software engineering research (which has tended 
to concentrate on avoiding or removing implementation 
faults), and a certain cubbyhole attitude that has led 
computer scientists to concentrate on the computer 
aspects of the system and engineers to concentrate on 
the physical and mechanical parts of the system with few 
people dealing with the interaction between the two [6]. 
While functional requirements often focus on what 
the system shall do, safety requirements must also 
include what the system shall not do - including means 
for eliminating and controlling system hazards and for 
limiting damage in case of a mishap. An important part 
of the safety requirements is the specification of the ways 
in which the software and. the system can fail safely and 
to what extent failure is tolerable. An important ques-
tion, of course, is how to identify the software safety 
requirements. 
Fault Tree Analysis (FT A) [33J is an analytical 
technique used in the safety analysis of electromechanical 
systems. An undesired system state is specified, and the 
system is then analyzed in the context of its environment 
and operation to find credible sequences of events that 
can lead to the undesired state. The fault tree is a 
graphic model of various parallel and sequential combi-
nations of faults (or system states) that will result in the 
occurrence of the predefined undesired event. The faults 
can be events that are associated with component 
hardware failures, human errors, or any other pertinent 
events that can lead to the undesired event. A fault tree 
thus depicts the logical interrelationships of basic events 
that lead to the hazardous event. One possible problem 
with the technique is that it is highly dependent on the 
ability of the person doing the analysis. The analyst 
needs to thoroughly understand the system being 
analyzed and its underlying scientific principles. 
An advantage in using this technique is that all the 
system components (including humans) can be con-
sidered. This is extremely important since, for example, 
a particular software fault may cause a mishap only if 
there is a simultaneous human and/or hardware failure. 
Alternatively, the environmental failure may cause the 
software fault to manifest itself. Many mishaps are the 
result of a sequence of interrelated failures in different 
parts of the system. 
The analysis process starts with the categorized list 
of system hazards that have been identified by the Prel-
iminary Hazard Analysis (PHA). A separate fault tree 
must be constructed for each hazardous event. The 
basic procedure is to assume that the hazard has 
occurred and then to work backward to determine its set 
of possible causes. The root of the fault tree is the 
hazardous event to be analyzed called the loss event. 
Necessary preconditions are described at the next level of 
the tree with either an AND or an OR relationship. 
Each subnode is expanded in a similar fashion until all' 
leaves describe events of -calculable probability or are 
unable to be analyzed for some reason. Figure 1 shows 
part of a fault tree for a hospital patient monitoring sys-
tem. 
Once the fault tree has been built down to the 
software interface (as in figure 1), the high level require-
ments for software safety have been delineated in terms 
of software faults and failures that could adversely affect 
the safety of the system. Software control faults may 
involve: 
• failure to perform a required function, i.e., the func-
tion is never executed or no answer is produced 
• performing a function not required, i.e., getting the 
wrong answer or issuing the wrong control instruc-
tion or doing the right thing but under inappropri-
ate conditions (for example, activating an actuator 
inadvertently, too early, too late, or failing to cease 
an operation at a prescribed time). 
• timing or sequencing problems, e.g., failing to ensure 
that two things happen at the same time, at 
different times, or in a particular order. 
• failure to recognize a hazardous .condition requiring 
corrective action 
• producing the wrong response to a hazardous condi-
tion. 
As the development of the software proceeds, fault tree 
analysis can be performed on the design and finally the 
actual code. 
We are also investigating Time Petri net models for 
their applicability to software hazard analysis. Petri 
nets [29J allow mathematical modeling of discrete-event 
systems. The system is modeled in terms of conditions 
and events and the relationship between them. Analysis 
and simulation procedures have been developed to deter-
mine desirable and undesirable properties of the design 
especially with respect to concurrent or parallel events. 
Leveson and Stolzy [21J have developed analysis pro-
cedures to determine software safety requirements . 
(including timing requirements) directly from the system 
design, to analyze a design for safety, recoverability, and 
fault tolerance, and to guide in the use of failure detec-
tion and recovery procedures. For most cases, the 
analysis procedures require construction of only a small 
part of the reachability graph. Procedures are also being 
developed to measure the risk of individual hazards. 
Although creating the entire Petri net reachability 
graph will show whether the system as designed can 
reach any hazardous states, the reachability problem for 
Petri nets has been shown to be exponential time- and 
space-hard. Therefore, it may well be impractical to 
generate the entire reachability graph. However, it is 
possible to use the same type of backward analysis used 
in fault trees, and we have developed an algorithm to do 
this [21). The algorithm requires only a small part of the 
graph to be generated in most cases. 
Briefly, the algorithm starts with the set of unsafe 
conditions. For each member of this set, the immedi-
ately prior state or states are generated from the inverse 
Petri net. Each of these "one-step-backward" states is 
then examined to see if it is potentially a critical state (a 
state from which there is both a path or paths from 
which it is possible to reach unsafe and possibly also safe 
states and a path or paths from which it is possible to 
reach only low-risk states). Once critical states are 
identified, paths to high-risk states can be eliminated 
from the design. Note that we start not with complete 
states but only with partial states. That is, some condi-
tions in the state are unimportant as far as safety is con-
cerned. Therefore, at the beginning of the analysis, the 
complete composition of the reachable high-risk states .is 
not known. The "don't-care" places in each state are 
"filled in" with those. conditions which are possible in 
the process of executing the algorithm. Note also that it 
is necessary only to look forward one step from each 
potentially critical state in order to label it as critical 
(i.e. there exists a next-state which is safe). This is true 
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Figure l: Top Levels of Patient Monitoring System Fault Tree 
because if this path also leads to a high-risk state, then 
it will be eliminated by the algorithm in a later step. 
The technique is conservative, i.e. in order to reduce 
the large amount of computing to produce the complete 
reachability graph, a larger number of critical states may 
be identified than actually exist. But it does no harm to 
eliminate the possibility of an accident which would not 
have occurred. Also, eliminating a non-existent path 
may have the effect of eliminating or lessening the possi-
bility of accidents caused by run-time faults and failures. 
Hazards which have been determined by the 
analysis to be plausible can be eliminated by appropri-
ately altering the design (using· interlocks, lockouts, 
watchdog timers, etc.) to ensure that paths (sequences of 
events) which will lead to the hazard are not taken. 
Also, since the Petri net graph is executable, simulation 
can be used for aspects of the problem for which analysis 
procedures are infeasible. 
Faults and failures can be incorporated into the 
Petri net model to determine their effects on the system. 
Backward analysis procedures can be used to determine 
which failures and faults are potentially the most hazar-
dous and therefore which parts of the system need to be 
augmented with fault-tolerance and fail-safe mechanisms. 
Early in the design of the system, it is possible to treat 
the software parts of the design at a very high level of 
abstraction and consider only failures at the interfaces of 
the software and non-software components. By working 
backward to this software interface, it is possible to 
determine the software safety requirements and identify 
the most critical functions. Formal definitions of safety, 
recoverability, and fault-tolerance have been determined 
and appropriate analysis procedures delineated. 
Timing can be added to Petri net models by putting 
minimum and maximum time limits on transitions or by 
putting times on conditions. Either way, it is possible to 
determine worst case timing requirements so that, for 
example, watchdog timers can be incorporated into the 
design if necessary. Finally, when probabilities are 
included in the model, minimal cut sets and other proba-
bilistic information is obtainable. 
One possible drawback to this approach is that 
building the Petri net model of the system is a nontrivial 
exercise. Some of the effort may be justified by the use 
of the model for other objectives, e.g., performance 
analysis. Petri net safety analysis techniques have yet to 
be tried on a realistic system so there is no information 
available on the practicality of the approach. 
The whole area of requirements analysis is one need-
ing more attention. System-wide techniques that allow 
consideration of the controlled system rather than just 
considering the software in isolation are in short supply. 
Verification and Validation of Safety 
A proof of safety involves a choice (or combination) 
of the following: 
1) showing that a fault cannot occur, i.e., that the 
software cannot get into an unsafe state and cannot 
direct the system into an unsafe state or 
2) showing that if a software fault occurs, it is not 
dangerous. 
Boebert [3J has argued eloquently that verification 
systems that prove the correspondence of source code to 
concrete specifications are only fragments of verification 
systems. They do not go high enough (to an inspectable 
statement of system behavior), and they do not go low 
enough (to the object code). The verification system 
must also capture the semantics of the hardware. 
One verification methodology for safety involves the 
use of Software Fault Tree Analysis {SFTA) (18,24,32]. 
Once the detailed design or code is completed, software 
fault tree analysis procedures can be used to work back-
ward from the critical control faults determined by the 
top levels of the fault tree through the program to verify 
whether the program can cause the top-level event or 
mishap. The basic technique used is the same backward 
reasoning (weakest precondition) approach that has been 
used in formal axiomatic verification [4], hut applied 
slightly differently than is common in "proofs of correct-
ness." 
The set of states or results of a program can be 
divided into two sets - correct and incorrect. Formal 
proofs of correctness attempt to verify that given a 
precondition that is true for the state before the program 
begins to execute, then the program halts and a postcon-
dition (representing the desired result) is true. That is, 
the program results in correct states. For continuous, 
purposely non-halting (cyclic) programs, intermediate 
states involving output may need to be considered. The 
basic goal of safety verification is more limited. We will 
assume that, by definition, the correct states are safe 
(i.e., that the designers did not intend for the syst~~ to 
have mishaps). The incorrect states can then be d1v1ded 
into two sets - those that are considered safe and those 
that are considered unsafe. Software Fault Tree 
Analysis attempts to verify that the program will never 
allow an unsafe state to be reached (although it says 
nothing about incorrect but safe states). 
Since the goal in safety verification is to prove that 
something will not happen, it is useful to use proof by 
contradiction. That is, it is assumed that the software 
has produced an unsafe control action, and it is shown 
that this could not happen since it leads to a logical con-
tradiction. Although a proof of correctness should 
theoretically be able to show that software is safe, it is 
often impractical to accomplish this because of the sheer 
magnitude of the proof effort involved and because of the · 
difficulty of completely specifying correct behavior. In 
the few SFT A proofs that have been performed, the 
proof appears to involve much less work than a proof of 
correctness (especially since the proof procedure can stop 
as soon as a contradiction is reached on a software path). 
Also, it is often easier to specify safety than complete 
correctness, especially since the requirements may be 
actually mandated by law or government authority as 
with nuclear weapon safety requirements in the U.S. 
Like correctness proofs, the analysis may be partially 
automated, but highly skilled human help is required. 
Software fault tree analysis starts at the software 
interface of the system fault tree and works back 
through the logic of the code. Constructs for some struc-
tured programming language statements are shown in 
Figures 2 through 7. In each, it is assumed that the 
statement caused the critical event. Then the tree is 
constructed considering how this might occur. An exam-
(1) A := F(Y); (2) B := X - 5.0; (3) if A> B then Suhl; 
· end if; 
Figure J: Sample Assignment Statements 
Suhl called 
(1) and (2) 
caused A> B 
(1) caused 
F(Y) > X-5.0 
Figure 3: Fault Tree for Assignment Statements 
pie of the procedure is shown in Figures 8 and 9. An 
Ada program segment is shown which iteratively solves a 
fixed point equation. One possible top-level (loss event) 
for the segment is that no answer is produced in the 
required time period (and the answer is critical. at this 
point). This loss event corresponds to the while loop 
executmg too long s own m gure as ax 1 era-· ( h . fi 9 "M " 't 
tions). 
In general, the software fault tree has one or both of 
the following patterns: 
1) A contradiction is found as shown in the left branch 
of figure 9. The building of the software fault tree 
(at least for this path) can stop at this point since 
the logic of the software cannot cause the event. 
This example does not deal with the problem of 
failures in the underlying implementation of the 
software, but this is possible. There is, of course, a 
practical limit to how much analysis can and need 
be done depending on individual factors associated 
with each project. It is always possible to insert 
assertions in the code to catch critical implementa-
tion errors at run-time. This is especially desirable 
if run-time software-initiated or software-controlled 
fail-safe procedures are possible. Note that the 
software fault tree provides the information neces-
sary to determine which assertions and run-time 
checks are the most critical and where they should 
be placed. Since checks at run-time are expensive 
in terms of time and other resources, this informa-
tion is extremely useful. 
procedure call 
caused the event 
procedure failing 
caused the event 
Figure 4: Fault Tree for a Procedure Call 
cond. true 
prior to IF 
event caused by 
if-then-else 
then-part 
caused event 
cond. false 
prior to IF 
else-part 
caused event 
Figure. 5: Fault Tree for an If-Then-Else Statement 
event prior 
to while 
event caused by 
while statement 
statement 
executed N times 
cond. false 
before while 
cond. true 
before while 
Nth iteration 
causes event 
Figure Ii: Fault Tree for a Wh.ile Statement 
cond. 1 
true 
clause 1 
caused it 
event caused by 
case statement 
cond. n 
true 
clause n 
caused it 
no cond. 
true 
Figure 7 : Fault Tree for a Case Statement 
else 
caused it 
get (X, Epa); 
Err:= Epa; 
[:=0; 
while Err ;::: Epa loop 
NewX := F(X); 
Err:= aba(X- NewX); 
I:= I+ 1; 
X := NewX; 
end loop 
Figure 8.: Example of Ada Code 
I>Ma:r: 
before loop 
O 2:: Ma:r: 
contradiction 
2} The fault tree runs through the code and out to the 
controlled system or its environment. In the exam-
ple of Figure 9, the fault tree shows one possible 
path to the loss event, and changes are necessary to 
eliminate the hazard. One appropriate action in 
this case may be to use run-time assertions to detect 
such conditions and to simply reject incorrect input 
or to initiate recovery techniques. Another possibil-
ity is to add redundant hardware, e.g. sensors, to 
eliminate incorrect input before it occurs. 
Software fault tree procedures for analyzing con-
currency and synchronization have been described by 
Leveson and Stolzy [20j. Introducing timing information 
into the fault tree causes serious problems. Fault tree 
analysis is essentially a static analysis technique while 
timing analysis involves dynamic aspects of the program. 
Taylor [32] has added timing information to fault trees 
by making the assumption that information about the 
no answer 
within 
allotted time 
l=Ma:r: 
while loop 
caused I 2:: M a:r: 
Cond False 
before loop 
Err 2:: Epa 
l<Ma:r: 
before loop 
l=Ma:r: 
Err=! F 1- 1(X) - F1(X) ! 
I FMa:&-l(X) - FMa"(X) !~ Epa 
Err ~ Eps&I < M a:r: 
j FM°"- 1(X) - FM0 "(X) \~ Eps 
Epa 2:: Eps&O < M a:r: 
Figure 9: Fault Tree for Code in Preceding Figure 
minimum and maximum execution time for sectiollll of 
code is known. Each node in the fault tree then haa an 
added component of execution time for that node. In 
view of the nondeterminism inherent in a multitasking 
environment, it may not be practical to verify that tim-
ing pi'obleIIIB cannot-occur in all cases. However, infor-
mation gained from the fault tree can be used to insert 
run-time checks including deadline mechanisms into the 
application program and the scheduler [19]. 
Fault trees can also be applied at the assembly 
language level to identify computer hardware fault 
modes (such as erroneous bits in the program counter, 
registers, or memory) that will cause the software to act 
in an undesired manner. Mcintee [24] has used this pro-
cess to examine the effect of single bit failures on a 
software fuze. The procedure identified credible 
hardware failures that could result in the inadvertent 
early arming of the weapon. Thia information was used 
to redesign the software so that the failure could be 
detected and a "DUD" (fail-safe} routine called. 
Finally, fault trees may be applied to the software 
design before the actual code is produced [17]. The pur-
pose is to enhance the safety of the design while reducing 
the amount of formal safety verification that is needed. 
Safe software design techniques are discussed in a later 
section of this paper. 
Experimental evidence of the practicality of SFT A 
is lacking. Examples of two small systems ( approxi-
mately 1000 lines of code) can be found in the literature 
[18,24]. There is no information available on how large a 
system can be analyzed with a realistic amount of effort 
and time. But even if the software is so large that com-
plete generation of the software trees is not possible, par-
tial trees may still be useful. For example, partial 
analysis may still find faults. Furthermore, partially 
complete software fault trees may be used to identify 
critical modules and critical functions which can then be 
augmented with software fault tolerance procedures [50]. 
They may also be used to determine appropriate run-
time acceptance and safety tests [19]. 
In summary, software fault tree analysis can be used 
to determine software safety requirements, to detect 
software logic errors, to identify multiple failure 
sequences involving different parts of the system 
(hardware, human, and software) that can lead to 
hazards, and to guide in the selection of critical run-time 
checks. It can also be used to guide testing. The inter-
faces of the software parts of the fault tree can be exam-
ined to determine appropriate test input data and 
appropriate simulation states and events. 
Many open questions remain such as: 
• For systems of what size and level of complexity are 
these techniques practical and useful? 
• How can they be extended to provide more informa-
tion? 
• How can they most effectively be used in software 
development projects? 
• What other approaches to software hazard analysis 
are possible? 
Important work remains to be done in extending and 
testing these proposed techniques and in developing new 
ones. 
Assessment of Safet11 
It is possible that safety is not as amenable to quan-
titative treatment as reliability and availability [8]. As 
noted several times, mishaps are almost without excep-
tion caused by multiple factors. Also, the probabilities 
tend to be so small that assessment is extremely difficult. 
For example, the frequency of mishaps for any particular 
model of aircraft and cause or group of causes (such as 
those that might be attributable to design or production 
deficiencies} is probably not great enough to provide sta-
tistically precise assessments of whether or not the air-
craft has met a specified mishap rate [8]. But despite 
this, attempts at measurement are being made. 
There are pros and cons in using any assessment 
techniques. Quantitative risk assessment can provide 
insight and understanding and allow comparison of alter-
natives. The necessity to calculate very low probability 
numbers forces a discipline on the analyst that requires 
studying the system in great detail. But there is also the 
danger of placing implicit belief in the accuracy of a cal-
culated number. It is easy to place too much emphasis 
on the models and forget the many assumptions that are 
implied. Recent events have poignantly demonstrated 
the fallibility and inaccuracy of such models. And since 
these approaches can never capture all the factors, such 
as quality of life, that are important in a problem, they 
should not become a substitute for careful human . 
judgment [25,26]. 
Another example of the problems associated with 
formal safety assessment is the "Titanic Effect". The 
Titanic was thought to be so safe that some normal 
safety procedures were neglected, resulting in many more 
lives being lost than might have been necessary. Unfor-
tunately, certain assumptions were made in the analysis 
that did not hold in practice. For example, the ship was 
built to stay afloat if four or less of the sixteen water-
tight compartments (spaces below the waterline) were 
flooded. Previously, there had never been an incident 
where more than four compartments of a ship were dam-
aged so this assumption was considered reasonable. 
Unfortunately, the iceberg ruptured five spaces. It can 
be argued that the assumptions were the best possible 
given the state of knowledge at that time. The mistake 
was in placing too much faith in the assumptions and 
the models and in not taking measures in case they were 
incorrect. Much effort is frequently diverted to proving 
theoretically that a system meets a stipulated level of 
risk when the effort could much more profitably be 
applied to eliminating, minimizing, and controlling 
hazards [10]. This seems especially true when the system 
contains software. Considering the inaccuracy of our 
present models for assessing software reliability, some of 
the resources applied to assessment might be more 
effectively utilized if applied to sophisticated software 
engineering and software safety techniques. Models &re 
important, but care and-judgment must be exercised in 
their use. 
Probabilities of complex fault sequences are often 
analyzed by using fault trees. Probabilities can be 
attached to the nodes of the tree, and the probability of 
system and minimal cut set failures can be calculated. 
Minimal cut sets are composed of all the unique combi-
nations of component events that can cause the top level 
event. To determine the minimal cut sets of a fault tree, 
the tree is first translated to its Boolean equations, and 
then Boolean algebra is used to simplify the expressions 
and to remove redundancies. This does not seem to be 
appropriate for software however. 
The question of how to assess software safety is still 
very much an unsolved problem. High software reliabil-
ity figures do not necessarily mean that the software is 
acceptable from the safety standpoint. Friedman [7] has 
recently completed a dissertation showing how penalty 
cost (or severity) can be added to standard software reli-
ability growth models. "Penalty cost" is a quantification 
of the undesired consequences of a failure, sometimes 
called a "severity rating." Mathematically, the model is 
developed as a compound stochastic process with failure 
frequency and severity components. The main purpose 
of the technique is to probabilistically characterize the 
aggregate penalty cost to be incurred over a future time 
interval. 
This is an area of research that has many interest-
ing questions including when and how safety assessment 
should be used and how it can be accomplished. There 
also needs to be some way of combining software and 
hardware assessments to provide system measurements. 
Design for Safety 
Once the hazardous system states have been 
identified and the software safety requirements deter-
mined, the system must be built to minimize risk and to 
satisfy these requirements. It is not possible to ensure 
the safety of a system by analysis and verification alone 
because these techniques are so complex as to be error-
prone themselves, the cost may be prohibitive, and elimi-
nation of all hazards may require too severe a perfor-
mance penalty. Therefore, hazards will need to be con-
trolled during the operation of the software, and this has 
important implications for design. 
System safety has an accepted order of precedence 
for applying safety design techniques. At the highest 
level, a system is intrinaicall11 safe if it is incapable of 
generating or releasing sufficient energy or causing harm-
ful exposures under normal or abnormal conditions 
(including outside forces and environmental failures) to 
cause a hazardous occurrence, given the equipment and 
personnel in their most vulnerable condition [23]. 
If an intrinsically safe design is not possible or prac-
tical, then the next step in design is to prevent or 
minimize the occurrence of hazards. This can be accom-
plished in hardware through such techniques as monitor-
ing and automatic control (e.g., automatic pressure relief 
valves, speed governors, limit-level sensing controls) 
lockouts, lockins, and interlocks [10]. A lockout devic~ 
prevents an event from occurring or prevents someone 
from entering a dangerous zone. A lockin is provided to 
maintain an event or condition. Finally, an interlock 
ensures that a sequence of operations occurs in the 
correct order. Th11:t is, it is provided to ensure that 
event A does not occur (1) inadvertently (e.g., a prelim-
inary, intentional action B is required before A can 
occur), (2) while condition C exists (e.g., an access door 
is placed on high voltage equipment so that when the 
door is opened, then the circuit is opened), and (3) 
before event D (e.g., the tank will fill only if the vent 
valve has been opened first). 
The next lower level of precedence is to design to 
control the hazard if it occurs using automatic safety 
devices. This includes detection of hazards and fail-safe 
designs as well as damage control, containment, and iso-
lation of hazards. 
The lowest level of precedence is to provide warning 
devices, procedures, and training to help personnel react 
to the hazard. 
Many of these system safety design principles are 
applicable to software. Note that software safety is not 
an afterthought to software design - it needs to be 
designed in from the beginning. There are two general 
design principles: (1) the design should provide leverage 
for the certification effort by minimizing the amount of 
verification required and simplifying the certification pro-
cedure, and (2) any design features to increase safety 
must be carefully evaluated in terms of any complexity 
that might be added. An increase in complexity may 
have a harmful effect on safety (as well as reliability). In 
fact, simplicity may be the most important design 
feature in increasing safety and reliability. 
A safe software design includes not only standard 
software engineering techniques to enhance reliability, 
but also special safety features. The emphasis here will 
be to survey those design features that are directly 
related to safety. Risk can be reduced by reducing 
hazard likelihood or severity or both. Hazards can be 
prevented, or they can be detected and treated. Preven-
tion of hazards tends to involve reducing functionality or 
design freedom, but detection is difficult and unreliable. 
Preventing Hazards Through Software Design 
Preventing hazards through design involves design-
ing the software so that faults and failures cannot cause 
hazards. That is, the software design is made intrinsi-
cally safe or the number of software hazards is minim-
ized. 
Software can cause problems through acts of' omis-
sion (failing to do something required) or commission 
(doing something that should not be done or doing some-
thing at the wrong time or in the wrong sequence). 
Software is usually extensively tested to try to ensure 
that it does what it is specified to do. But due to its 
complexity, it may be- able to do a lot more than the 
software designers specified (or intended). Design 
features can be used to limit the actions of the software. 
As an example, it may be possible to use modulari-
zation and data access limitation to separate non-critical 
functions from critical functions and to ensure that 
failures of non-critical modules cannot put the system 
into a hazardous state, e.g., cannot impede the operation 
of the safety-critical functions. The basic idea is to 
reduce the amount of software that affects safety (and 
thus to reduce the verification effort involved) and to 
change as many potentially critical faults into non-
critical faults as possible. The separation of critical and 
non-critical functions may be difficult, however. In any 
certification arguments that are based on this approach, 
it will be necessary to provide supporting analyses that 
prove that there is no way that the safety of the system 
can be compromised by faults in the non-critical 
software. 
Often in safety-critical software there are a few 
modules and/or data items that must be carefully pro-
tected because their execution (or in the case of data, 
their destruction or change) at the wrong time can be 
catastrophic, e.g., the insulin pump administers insulin 
when the blood sugar is low or the missile launch routine 
is inadvertently activated. It has been suggested [13] 
that security techniques involving authority limitation 
may be useful in protecting safety-critical functions and 
data. Security techniques devised to protect against mal-
icious actions can be used sometimes to protect against 
inadvertent but dangerous actions. In this approach, the 
safety-critical parts of the software are separated using 
the above techniques, and an attempt is made to limit 
the authority of the rest of the software to do anything 
safety-critical. The safety-critical routines can then be 
carefully protected. For example, the ability of the 
software to arm and detonate a weapon might be 
severely limited and carefully controlled with multiple 
confirmations required. Note that this is another exam- · 
pie of safety possibly conflicting with reliability. To 
maximize reliability, it is desirable that faults be unable 
to disrupt the operation of the weapon. However, for 
safety, faults should lead to non-operation. That is, for 
reliability the goal is a multi-point failure mode while 
safety is enhanced in this case by a single-point failure 
mode. 
Authority limitation with regard to inadvertent 
activation can also be implemented by retaining a person 
in the loop. That is, a positive input by a human con-
troller may be required prior to execution of certain com-
mands. Obviously, the human will require some 
independent source of information on which to base the 
decision besides the information provided by the com-
puter. 
In some systems, it is impossible to always avoid 
hazardous states. In fact, they may be required for the 
system to accomplish its function. A general software 
design goal is to minimize the amount of time a poten-
tially hazardous state exists. One simple way this can be 
accomplished is to start out in a safe state and require a 
change to a higher risk state. Also, critical flags and con-
ditions should be set or checked as close to the code that 
they protect as possible. Finally, critical conditions 
should not be complementary (e.g., absence of the arm 
condition should not mean safe). 
Often the sequence of events is critical. For exam-
ple, a valve may need to be opened prior to filling a tank 
in order to relieve pressure. In electromechanical sys-
tems, an interlock is used to ensure sequencing or to iso-
late two events in time. An example is a guard gate at a 
railroad crossing that keeps people from crossing the 
track until the train has passed. Equivalent design 
features often need to be included in software. Program-
ming language concurrency and synchronization features 
are used to order events, but do not necessarily protect 
against inadvertent branches caused either by a software 
fault (in fact, they are often so complex as to be error-
prone themselves) or by a hardware fault (a serious 
problem, for example, in aerospace systems where 
hardware is subject to unusual environmental stress such 
as cosmic ray bombardment). Some protection can be 
afforded by the use of batons (a variable that is checked 
before the function is executed to ensure that the previ-
ously required routines have entered their signature) and 
handshaking. Another example of designing to protect 
against hardware failure is to ensure that bit patterns 
used to satisfy a conditional branch to a safety-critical 
function do not use common failure patterns (i.e., all 
zeros). 
Finally, Neumann [27] has suggested the application 
of hierarchical design to simultaneously attain a variety 
of important requirements such as reliability, availabil-
ity, security, privacy, integrity, timely responsiveness, 
long-term evolvability, and safety. By accommodating 
all of these requirements within a unified hierarchy, he 
claims that a sensible ordering of degrees of criticality 
can be achieved that is directly and naturally related to 
the design structure. 
Detection and Treatment at Run-Time 
Along with attempts to prevent hazards, it may be 
necessary to attempt to detect and treat them during 
execution. It is helpful to divide the latter techniques 
into those concerned with detection of unsafe states and 
those that involve response to unsafe states once they 
have been detected. 
Ad hoc tests for unsafe conditions can be pro-
grammed into any software, but some general mechan-
isms have been proposed and implemented including 
assertions, exception-handling, external monitors, and 
watchdog timers. Monitors or checks may be in-line or 
external, and they may be at the same or a higher level 
of hierarchy. In general, it is important (1) to detect 
unsafe states as quickly as possible in order to minimize 
exposure time, (2) to have monitors that are indepen-
dent from the application software so that faults in one 
cannot disable the other, and (3) to have the monitor 
add aa little complexity to the system as possible. A 
general design for a saft!tY monitor facility is proposed in 
Leveson, Shimeall, Stolzy, Thomas [22J. 
Although many mechanisms have been proposed to 
help implement fault detection, little assistance is pro-
vided for the more difficult problem of formulating the 
content of the checks. We have suggested that the 
information contained in the software safety analysis can 
be used to guide the content and placement of run-time 
checks [19J. 
Recovery routines are needed (from a safety stand-
point) when an unsafe state is detected externally, when 
it is determined that the software cannot provide a 
required output within a prescribed time limit, or when 
continuation of a regular routine would lead to a 
catastrophic system state if there is no intercession. 
Recovery techniques can, in general, be divided into two 
types - backward and forward. 
Backward recovery techniques basically involve 
returning the system to a prior state (hopefully one that 
precedes the fault) and then going forward again with an 
alternate piece of code. There is no attempt to diagnose 
the particular fault that caused the error nor to assess 
the extent of any other damage the fault may have 
caused [lJ. Note the assumption that the alternate code 
will work better than the original code. To try to ensure 
this, different algorithms may be used (e.g., algorithms 
that were not chosen originally for efficiency or other 
reasons). There is, of course, still a possibility that the 
alternate algorithms also will produce undesired results 
[12J. This is especially likely if the error originated from 
flawed specifications and misunderstandings about the 
required operation of the software. 
Backward recovery is adequate if it can be 
guaranteed that software faults will be detected and suc-
cessful recovery completed before the faults affect the 
external state. However, this usually cannot be 
guaranteed. Fault tolerance facilities may fail or it may 
be determined that a correct output cannot be produced 
within prescribed time limits. Control actions that 
depend upon the incremental state of the system such as 
torquing a gyro or use of a stepping motor cannot be 
recovered by checkpoint and rollback [30]. A software 
error may not necessarily be readily or immediately 
apparent. A small error may require hours to build up 
to a value that exceeds a prescribed safety tolerance 
limit. And even if backward application software 
recovery is attempted, it may be necessary to take some 
concurrent action in parallel with the recovery pro-
cedures. For example, it may be necessary to ensure 
containment of any possible radiation or chemical leak-
age while attempting software recovery. Therefore, for-
ward recovery to repair any damage or minimize hazards 
will be required [14J. 
Forward recovery includes techniques that attempt 
to repair the faulty state. This may involve an internal 
state of the computer or the state of the controlled pro-
cess. Forward recovery techniques may return the sys-
tem to a correct state or, if that is not possible, contain 
or minimize the effects of the failure. Examples of for-
ward recovery techniques include using robust data 
structures [31], dynamically altering the flow of control, 
ignoring single cycle errors that will be corrected on the 
next iteration, and changing to a reduced function or 
fail-safe mode. 
Most safety-critical systems are designed to have a 
safe-side, that is, a state that is reachable from any 
other state and that is always safe. Often this safe side 
has penalties from a performance standpoint; for exam-
ple, the system may be shut-down or switched to a sub-
system that can provide fewer services. Besides shutting 
down, it may be necessary to take some action to avoid 
harm, such as blowing up a rocket in mid-air. Note that 
these types of safety systems may themselves cause harm 
as shown by an emergency software destruct facility that 
accidentally blew up 72 French weather balloons [2]. 
In more complex designs, there may be intermediate 
safe states with limited functionality, especially in those 
systems for which a shutdown would be hazardous itself. 
For example, a failure of a traffic light often results in 
the light being switched to a state with the light blinking 
red in all directions. The X-29 is an experimental, 
unstable aircraft that cannot be flown safely by human 
control alone. If the digital computers fail, control is 
switched to an analog device that provides less func-
tionality than the digital computers but allows the plane 
to land safely. The new U.S. Air Traffic Control system 
has a requirement to provide for several levels of service 
including Full Service, Reduced Capability, and Emer-
gency Mode. Keeping a person in the loop is another 
simple design for a backup system. 
In general, the non-normal control modes for a 
process-control system might include: 
• Partial Shutdown: the system has partial or 
degraded functionality 
• 
• 
• 
• 
Hold: no functionality is provided, but steps are 
taken to maintain safety or to limit the amount of 
damage 
Emergency Shutdown: the system is shutdown 
completely 
Manual or Externally Controlled: the system con-
tinues to function, but control is switched to a 
source external to the computer - the computer 
may be responsible for a smooth transition 
Restart: the system is in a transitional state from 
non-normal to normal. 
Reconfiguration or dynamically altering the flow of 
control is a form of partial shutdown. In real-time sys-
tems it is often the case that the criticality of tasks may 
change during processing and may depend upon run-ti~e 
environmental conditions. If peak system overload 1s 
increasing the response time above some critical value, 
run-time reconfiguration of the system may be achieved 
by delaying or temporarily eliminating non-critical func-
tions. Note that system overload may be caused or 
increased by internal conditions such as excessive 
attempts to perform backward recovery. 
It may be helpful fo· see how these ideas can be put 
together into a realistic system. Higgs [11] describes the 
design of the software to control a turbine-generator. 
This design provides an example of the use of several of 
the techniques described above including a very simple 
hierarchy, self-test, and reduction of complexity. The 
safety requirements for the system include the require-
ments that (1) the governor should always be able to 
close the steam valves within a few hundred milliseconds 
if overstressing or even catastrophic destruction of the 
turbine is to be avoided, and (2) under no circumstances 
can the steam valves open spuriously, whatever the 
nature of the internal or external fault. 
The software is designed as a two-level structure 
with the top-level responsible for the less important 
governing functions and for the supervisory, co-
ordination, and management functions. Loss of the 
upper level cannot endanger the turbine and does not 
cause the turbine to shutdown. The upper control level 
uses conventional hardware and software and resides on 
a separate processor from the base level software. 
The base level is a secure software core that can 
detect significant failures of the hardware that surrounds 
it. It includes self-checks to decide whether incoming 
signals are sensible and whether the processor itself is 
functioning correctly. A failure of a self-check leads to 
the output reverting to a safe state through the action of 
fail-safe hardware. There are two potential software 
safety problems: (1) the code responsible for self-
checking, validating incoming and outgoing signals, and 
for promoting the fail-safe shutdown must be effectively 
error-free, and (2) spurious corruption of this vital code 
must not cause a dangerous condition or allow a dor-
mant fault to be manifested. 
Base level software is held as firmware and written 
in assembler for speed. No interrupts are used in this 
code other than the one, nonmaskable interrupt used to 
stop the processor in event of a fatal store fault. The. 
avoidance of interrupts means that the timing and 
sequencing of operation of the processor can be defined 
for any particular state at any time. This allows the 
opportunity for more rigorous and exhaustive testing. 
The avoidance of interrupts means that polling must be 
used. A simple design in which all messages are uni-
directional and there are no contention or recovery pro-
tocols required is also aimed at ensuring a higher level of 
predictability in the operation of the base software. 
The organization of the base level functional tasks is 
under the control of a comprehensive state table that, in 
addition to defining the scheduling of tasks, also deter-
. mines the various self-check criteria that are appropriate 
under particular conditions. The ability to accurately 
predict the scheduling of the processes means that very 
precise timing criteria can be applied to the execution 
time of certain sections of the most important code such 
as the self-check and watchdog routines. Finally, the 
store is continuously checked for faults. 
We are attempting to put these ideas together into 
a design methodology for safety-critical software. Before 
this is possible, however, it is necessary to.sort out which 
proposed techniques are practical and effective. A series 
of experiments is planned to provide some of this infor-
mation. The results will be used to ·design more effective 
procedures. 
Conclusions 
This paper has attempted to present some basic 
software safety ideas and to describe some of the work 
completed, underway, and planned at UCI. There is still 
a long way to go before Murphy is a fully integrated 
methodology instead of the current set of isolated tools 
and techniques. Some preliminary ideas have been pro-
posed about how all of these ideas might be put together 
and integrated into a software development program 
[16]. But many questions need to be answered including: 
• What drawbacks do the current techniques have 
which. might be improved and how· can this be. 
accomplished? What other techniques appear 
promising besides those currently being investi-
gated? 
• Are the techniques which have been developed use-
ful and practical for real systems (and not just toy 
examples in research papers)? For systems of what 
size and complexity are they useful? How can they 
be extended to provide more information? How can 
they most effectively be used in software develop-
ment projects? 
• How can the tools and techniques we are developing 
be used together to augment the usefulness of each? 
For example, how can the results of Petri net 
analysis be used to guide and optimize software 
fault tree analysis? How can the results of each be 
used to help design the software to handle run-time 
fault detection and recovery? 
• How should the Murphy methodology be experimen-
tally validated? Is it useful? Is it practical? For 
systems of what size and complexity? Does it solve 
real problems? 
Unfortunately, there are more questions than answers 
with respect to software safety. Until some of these 
questions are answered, the best that builders of safety-
critical software can do is (1) to select a suite of tech-
niques and tools spanning the entire software develop-
ment process that appear to be coherent and useful, and 
(2) to apply them in a conscientious and thorough 
manner. Dependence on any one technique is unwise at 
this stage of knowledge. The tools must then be 
integrated into the software development program and 
be accompanied by a management commitment to an 
effective safety effort. 
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